Chapter 5.1

Dynamics of Exclusion: Violence and Security Policies in Johannesburg

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INTRODUCTION

Security is one of the most serious challenges facing governments and authorities, particularly newly democratic regimes such as that of South Africa. Although problems of security also arise in rural areas, this is essentially an urban phenomenon. Challenges to internal security are also a 'social phenomenon', affecting community cohesion and lifestyle. In Johannesburg and elsewhere widespread concern about crime has led to significant social change and demographic transformation: A new geography is being drawn.

South Africa is one of the rare countries to have experienced a peaceful transition to democracy. Whereas South Africa was shunned by the international community until the mid 1990s, it has now become a model of democracy, peace, and inter-racial harmony. However, despite the 'successful' transition to democracy, democratic governance in South Africa increasingly has been challenged by the near systemic levels of violence and the widespread nature of criminal activity. In response to concern over crime and violence, public authorities are beginning to address these issues. The private sector, for its part, is adopting new economic strategies to provide alternative solutions attractive to a larger public.

Overall, crime does not affect all sectors of the population and all social classes equally. The fact that the definition of 'violence' differs amongst varying social classes is in itself problematic, for 'violence' and its effects are understood and experienced differently. 'Violence' is not synonymous with 'crime', but should be understood as a broader phenomenon.

This paper examines urban violence in Johannesburg. In investigating this issue it is essential to understand the importance of perceptions and the significance of public and institutional discourses on urban dynamics and their relation to crime, security, and insecurity. Many factors are inter-related, such as the question of access to private security services and how this influences the urban landscape. South Africa today once again is subject to international condemnation. Johannesburg is considered the crime capital of the world. However, urban violence does not necessarily represent a genuine threat. It might, in fact, be more a matter of perception. This paper presents responses to these – real and/or perceived – threats.

The end of apartheid was supposedly accompanied by a relative 'desegregation'. With the privatization of the urban landscape, however, what was formerly 'racial' segregation is fast becoming social segregation. This segregation favors those with

the financial means to protect themselves from the criminal environment and erect gated communities,[1] far from the old Central Business District (CBD), the townships, and the social reality of the South African majority.

The criminal environment has significant consequences for the credibility and stability of political institutions. When the state no longer has the monopoly of violence – legitimate or illegitimate – it loses its capacity to provide security, leading vigilante groups and the private security industry to develop new strategies to achieve their own goals.

INSECURITY STATEMENTS

The feeling of insecurity is growing among residents of South Africa (see Figure 5.1.1). According to the International Crime Victim Survey,[2] fear of crime grew to 53 per cent in 2000 from 43.7 per cent in 1992, whilst the number of victims interviewed remained steady during the same period. However, the statistics do not indicate an actual serious rise in criminality. It should be noted that criminality statistics are available only since 1994, corresponding to an increased transparency in the information and communication systems.

Figure 5.1.1 Johannesburg: Feeling of safety when walking alone after dark
Source: Naudé et al. (2000).

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[1] 'Gated Communities refer to a physical area that is fenced or walled off from its surroundings, either prohibiting or controlling access to these areas by means of gates or booms. In many cases, the concept can refer to a residential area with restricted access so that normally public spaces are privatized or use is restricted. It does not, however, only refer to residential areas, but may also include controlled access villages for work (office blocks), commercial and/or recreational purposes (many shopping complexes, malls etc). Gated communities can include both enclosed neighbourhoods and security villages.' Definition given on the website: http://www.gatedcomsa.co.za and proposed by Landman (2000).
[2] ICVS International Working Group, International Crime Victim Survey, 1989–1997, available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu: 8080/NACJD-STUDY/02973.xml.

Nevertheless, violence in South Africa has become commonplace, due in part to its frequency but due also to the high coverage by the media. Failed public policies on crime are widely criticized: 'It is obvious that fear of crime is increasing, which can probably be ascribed to less faith in the abilities of the police to control and reduce crime and the high media coverage accorded to crime in South Africa since the end of the liberation struggle'.[3]

Public authorities have attempted to solve urban violence problems by providing new housing and access to water for poorer citizens and also by declaring stabilization policies. They released a National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), which foresees increased cooperation between justice, police, and prisons. However, the results of such programmes were minimal and failed to meet public expectations following the end of the apartheid regime.

Private security companies therefore appear to be an attractive alternative to public protection. When citizens cannot afford to hire private services, however, they try to impose their own order. Vigilante groups mistrust the formal judicial system and rule of law and usurp the role of the police, undermining the state's traditional monopoly of 'legitimate' violence. Some groups have even suggested that 'without corporal punishment, government will never stop crime in South Africa'.[4]

In Johannesburg crime has become territorial. It 'does not affect all people uniformly, and the risk of being a crime victim is strongly influenced by gender, ethnicity, age, income and place of residence'.[5] Some areas of the city experience higher rates of both serious and petty criminality. Such territorialization is directly related to the means available to residents for their protection. Statistics on the number of murders show that the white population, which mostly lives in the northern suburbs, is least exposed and the black population, which mostly lives in the city centre or townships such as Soweto or Alexandra, are much more exposed to murderers (see Map 5.1.1). While black Africans are at a higher risk for individual violent crimes, non-black Africans are at higher risk for property-related household crimes'.[6]

RISK PERCEPTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES

As in other countries, crime and insecurity is a common theme in the media. The media itself greatly contributes to an increased sense of insecurity. *The Star*, one of Johannesburg's most popular daily newspapers, publishes a 'crime count + crime-busters' column which marks the place of crime in society. This column and an accompanying map the newspaper published significantly has influenced intra-city migration. The wealthy upper middle class is now moving towards the northern suburbs, whereas a decade ago they were still located and based in the CBD. 'Fear and insecurity among South Africans can also lead to other economic consequences like the decay of CBD's and other crime hot spot areas, causing businesses to close

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[3]   See Naudé, Prinsloo, and Snyman (2000), p. 66.

[4]   Statement of Magolego Montle, president of Mapogo, on ISS seminar, 8 June 2001, in Sekhonyane and Louw (2002), p. 17.

[5]   United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2002).

[6]   Ibid.

the repartition of the population

■ African
■ Indian
□ Coloured
□ White

murder repartition

■ + de 100
■ 51 - 100
□ 21 - 50
□ 0 - 20

Map 5.1.1 Johannesburg: Criminality rates

down. This in turn has a negative impact on employment and results in over-invest-ment in security measures'.[7] Meanwhile the re-appropriation of the town centre by the black population and the resulting formal and informal businesses keep this dynamic functioning.

The police makes recommendations on appropriate behaviour to defend against crime, for instance:

- If you intend to travel anywhere, avoid roads or areas that are well known as high crime areas.
- Never walk around alone after dark
- Never carry a lot of money or jewellery with you.
- Be wary of strangers and always be on the lookout for strange cars or people.
- Memorize all emergency numbers, and if possible, pre-program them into your telephone's speed dial.
- Keep your eyes and ears open. In short, never drop your guard and try to remain as alert as possible at all times.
- Avoid suspicious schemes that offer you great fortunes of money and which are offered in person in the mail.[8]

In issuing such warnings, public authorities indicate their own inability to address the root causes of crime.

According to the National Victims of Crime Survey published in 2000, only 45 per cent of victims (38 per cent in 1998) were satisfied with the police services allowance (see Table 5.1.1). Such results indicate that the police is viewed with suspicion, even though more confidence is accorded to the local police services. This negative percep-tion extends to a fear and dislike of public services/authorities in general.

Even if 'today we have the objective to restore confidence in the police',[9] the focus of the police on the issues of crime and security, in itself, encourages individuals to protect themselves by employing private security industries to guard their properties.

THE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME

Governmental policies

Public policies

Although apartheid has come to an end, public opinion on government authorities has changed only slowly. Judicial institutions continue to be seen as tools which reinforce the rule of the white minority. This perception has significant repercussions: 'The poor performance of the criminal justice system is not simply an issue of governance.

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[7]   Crime Information Analysis Centre (2001), p. 12.

[8]   South African Police Service, Area Johannesburg Communication Service, 'Crime prevention is everybody's business'. The flyer specifies: 'In this leaflet are tips to help you prevent crime in your home and your neighbourhood. We encourage you to copy and distribute this pamphlet among your family, friends, colleagues and workers.'

[9]   Gill Gifford, journalist, *The Star*, Interview on 12 September 2002.

Table 5.1.1 Johannesburg: Opinions of respondents on crime-related aspects

Variable	Specifications	Average
Attitudes towards the local police	Very good job	14.1
	A fairly good job	31.6
	A fairly poor job	24.2
	Very poor job	29.2
	Don't know	0.9
The police do everything they can to help people and to be of service	Fully agree	13.2
	Tend to agree	33.6
	Tend to disagree	27.7
	Fully disagree	24.6
	Don't know	0.9
Attitudes towards private security protection services	Very good job	34.7
	A fairly good job	37.9
	A fairly poor job	16.3
	Very poor job	9.6
	Don't know	1.5
Expanded policing functions performed by private security	Good development	79.3
	Bad development	19.4
	Don't know	1.3

Source: Naudé B., et al. (2000) p. 56.

In South Africa it risks affecting the stability of the state and the well being of the constitutional order'.[10] Implementing a fair and impartial judicial system is a difficult task given the general lack of resources, experience, and time. In 2000, only 8 per cent of the 2.6 reported million crimes were punished. The criminal justice system must rapidly become more efficient, or it will eventually fail, as did its predecessor under the apartheid system. Most legal procedures take too much time and 'while the prisons are overcrowded, there is little the prison authorities can do about this. The department of correctional service has to accommodate all persons sent its way by courts – suspects who are denied bail and awaiting trial, and convicted offenders sentenced to a period of imprisonment'.[11] Dealing with crime nevertheless became a national priority with the implementation of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) in March 1995. Initially, its aim was to create different regulatory organs to tackle security and justice issues. 'It was understood that the four lead Ministries involved in the management of communities and the minimization of crime operate in a continuum. Police arrest suspects for crimes committed; courts of justice try cases and convict perpetrators; prisons incarcerate sentenced prisoners; social workers reintegrate convicts who have completed their sentences'.[12]

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[10] Schönteich (2002), p. 1.

[11] Schönteich (2002), p. 2.

[12] Spindler, *Business Against Crime*, interview on 20 February 2003.

Outside of the criminal justice process, three essential fields of intervention concern the NCPS: Environment, education, and transnational crime. Specific strategies to control the use of drugs and the proliferation of light weapons were initially not included in the program, even though these criminal activities are well established. However, 'the NCPS was reviewed in 1999 with the following being declared priority crimes: crimes involving firearms, organized crime, corruption in the criminal justice system and interpersonal violence (domestic violence, rape, violence by and among young males)'.[13]

The state authority planned to implement a concerted policy under which all agencies, governmental bodies, and the civil society worked together. Yet the complexity of the strategy seems to limit the successful realization of such policies.

Public-private partnership

Business Against Crime (BAC), a new public-private partnership, aims to reduce criminality by assisting the public authorities. Financial assistance by businesses has contributed to the rehabilitation of many areas, particularly in the old CBD. BAC was created in response to President Nelson Mandela's wish to invite the private sector 'to assist the police in the fight against crime by providing resources to under-resourced police stations and courts'.[14] Working in cooperation with the provincial governments and judicial departments required that BAC establish bases in local areas. In Gauteng, the second province to experiment with the programme, the objectives were clear: 'Together with government, and in partnership with citizens of our country, we aim to make South Africa a safer place to live, work and do business in (…) We proudly reflect partnership between business and government, at all levels, that is regarded as one of the best practices of its find, internationally'.[15]

BAC in Johannesburg has two essential functions. The first consists of the elaboration of a new judicial system to implement the policy defined by the NCPS. 'BAC's work focuses on different aspects of the justice administration system, and through different projects, we are attempting to bring this efficiency about'.[16]

The second is technical surveillance, using video cameras in public spaces. The Johannesburg Central policing area is one of the rare districts in the whole country to have a widespread closed circuit television (CCTV) coverage. This was made possible by the close partnership between BAC and the South African Police Services (SAPS) starting in April 2000. At least 360 cameras are permanently filming the old CBD and other strategic places like railway stations and goods depots. The staff employed by BAC works in shifts and is supported by the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police and the SAPS. Today public authorities respond to BAC calls within 60 seconds, which reduces time for criminals to act. 'We have achieved our aim of responding to any incident in the inner city in under 60 seconds. But our first priority, of course, is to prevent incidents from occurring at all. Without sustained,

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[13] Naudé, Prinsloo, and Snyman (2000), p. 29.

[14] Naudé, Prinsloo, and Snyman (2000), p. 27.

[15] Business Against Crime, *Annual Report* 2001–2002, Eastern Cape, p. 3.

[16] Spindler Dave, *Business Against Crime*, interview on 20 February 2003.

around-the-clock, professionally-managed monitoring by highly trained operators, the system would be of limited value to law enforcement agencies'.[17]

By increasingly relying on such public-private partnerships the state authorities essentially concede that they are unable to effectively control the public space. However, the short-term effectiveness of these partnerships is not to be underestimated. 'Since the introduction of the BACST (Business Against Crime Surveillance Technology) system, crime levels in the CBD have dramatically decreased by some 80 per cent in areas covered by the network'.[18] Nonetheless, one might question if violence is not only being displaced and the level of crime decreasing only in the areas surveilled by the CCTV.

As has been suggested above, promises of a concerted 'war against crime' seem to exceed governmental financial and institutional capacities. The longer public expectations remain unfulfilled, the more the governing democratic authorities loose credibility. Against this background, self-policing and private security recourses are becoming increasingly appealing alternatives. The SAPS seems to be aware of the potential consequences of such a shift in the security provision. 'It is public notoriety that different socio-economical classes of the national population have some different security needs. It is also supposed that safest measures are disposable only for the ones who could afford it, because they are very expensive. This could lead to public security policies especially conceived for the poorest, and private security policies for the richest. If it is really the case, what is the future for the national police services?'[19]

The private security empire

Vigilantism

In post-apartheid South Africa, vigilantism has developed rapidly due to a loss of trust in public authorities (such as the police or the criminal justice system) to effectively fight crime and violence. This has led to a growth of vigilantism (see Table 5.1.2).

Vigilantism is not a new phenomenon in South Africa: 'According to Coleman, vigilante groups first made their appearance in South Africa around 1985 and have their origins in the support systems that were built up around the highly unpopular structures of homeland authorities and Black Local Authorities created under apartheid. During this period vigilante groups were conservative groupings either formed by or supported by the state, to destroy resistance against apartheid'.[20]

After the end of apartheid and other dictatorial political regimes in the Southern Africa region, the weapons business also contributed to the development of vigilante activities. The new government admits that it is unable to control and regulate the influx of light weapons such as the AK 47. 'According to the police Central Firearms Registry, 3.5 million South Africans legally possess 4.2 million firearms, and it is

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[17] Penberthy John, *Business Against Crime* managing director in http://www.bac.co.za/ (accessed on 13 May 2003).

[18] Neville Huxham, General Manager, *Business Against Crime*, interview on 12 September 2002.

[19] South African Police Service (1996), p. 18.

[20] Coleman (1998), p. 113; Sekhonyane, M., Louw, A. (2002), p. 8.

Table 5.1.2 Reasons for not reporting crime to the police in Johannesburg[1]

Variable	Row %
N	802.0
Solved it myself	23.7
Police could do nothing	20.3
Not serious enough	16.3
Police won't do anything	10.0
Other	29.7

[1] Representative percentage on total sample who offered reasons for not reporting crime to the police.

Source: Naudé et al. (2000) p. 56, p. 117.

estimated that a similar number of illicit firearms are circulating in the country. Most firearms used to commit crimes originate from theft or loss of private and state owned firearms'.[21] Furthermore, 18.7 per cent of the South African population carries a firearm and 58.9 per cent declares that such possession is necessary to ensure their own protection. However, 'it is evident that firearm owners seldom have to use their weapons to defend themselves or to prevent crime'.[22]

Vigilante groups consider themselves to be a form of 'popular justice'. Even if they undermine the rule of law and contribute to the debilitation of the state, their very existence underlines the deep unrest in which South African society flounders. 'We are a desperate nation (…) Whenever you see people joining *Mapogo* [a vigilante group based in the Northern Province], you must know that the climate is not right.'[23] The inefficiency of public policies legitimates the actions of vigilante groups which, in turn, reinforces the weakness of the state and undermines public compliance to the rule of law. Although it is difficult to quantify the problem, according to an inquiry undertaken in the Eastern Cape in 1999, one out of twenty people admitted to be involved in vigilante activities and one person out of five said that she/he was thinking about it.[24] Thus the increase of vigilantism could be considered as a negative consequence of the ineffectiveness of public policies:

> South Africa's high crime rate and inefficient criminal justice system causes many people to feel at best insecure, and at worst held to ransom by both criminals and the government. As a result, public confidence in the police and the courts has decreased in the last few years. Many people have turned to self-help safety measures or have sought assistance outside government for protection against crime. The most obvious example is the private security industry, which continues to grow in South Africa. But for those who cannot afford to buy these services, vigilantism has become a viable option.[25]

[21] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2002), p. 69.
[22] Naudé, Prinsloo, Snyman, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
[23] Statement of Magolego Montle, president of Mapogo in Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) p. 3.
[24] Schönteich (2000).
[25] Sekhonyane and Louw (2002) p. III.

The private security industry

The rapidly growing private security industry has clearly benefited from the inade-
quacies of public security policies in Johannesburg, evidenced by the increase of
foreign direct investment in this area. The industry grew quickly in the 1990s,
initially at a rate of 30 per cent per year. Today, the number of private security officers
in the Gauteng province (42 085)[26] has surpassed the number of public security
agents (20 337).[27] That said, the sector is not homogeneous and different companies
provide many different services. Furthermore, due to internal competition, it is
extremely difficult to regulate this market.

The private security industry in South Africa includes 229 447 officers in service.
42 085 officers are in the Gauteng province. 'There are more than four private secu-
rity guards for every uniformed member of the SAPS engaged in visible policing
work'.[28] A total of 4545 companies are registered with the Private Security Industry
Regulatory Authority[29] (see Table 5.1.3), while in March 1999, 5343 security compa-
nies were recorded to the Security Officers' Board.

In terms of human resources, the private security industry has grown at a rate of
12.5 per cent per year in the last five years. According to Godfrey King, the editor of
the monthly *Security Focus*, in 1999 the surplus generated by the private security
industry amounted to USD 1.9 billion (the annual budget of the SAPS the same year
was USD 2.4 billion), while ten years before it generated only USD 160 483. Foreign
direct investment is now estimated to be USD 482 million. 'Private security compa-
nies are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Ten years ago, traders on
the JSE expressed little interest in private security companies. This is changing,
however, as investors realize that the private security industry has become a growing
and profitable sector of the economy. As a result, entrepreneurs are increasingly
involved in the running of private security companies'.[30] The number of companies
creates competition and leads to a multiplying effect. 'The Authority has noticed that
there is a new phenomenon taking place and there is a tendency to consolidate the
large private security businesses through mergers as well as through take-overs of the
smaller security businesses. This tendency may lead to a few large businesses domi-
nating and even monopolizing the South African private security market'.[31]

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[26] Ronel, *Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority*, interview on 22 May 2003.

[27] http://www.joburg.org.za

[28] Irish (1999).

[29] 'The Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001 and the regulations made in terms thereof
came into effect on 14 February 2002, and *inter alia*, dissolved the Security Officers' Interim Board
and established the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority.

   'The Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority is an organ of the state, fully funded by the
private security industry and charged by the parliament with the regulation of the private security
industry. The new legislation creates a much more sophisticated regulatory framework, which
increases both the scope and depth of regulation of the private security in South Africa. Through the
exclusion of direct involvement of the security industry in the running of the affairs of the Authority, a
conflict of interests is avoided. This brings South Africa in line with the international tendency to have
a regulatory body that is independent of the security industry and will thus not be subject to undue
influence from the security industry'. Quoted from Ronel, V. (interview on 22 May 2003).

[30] Irish (1999), p. 20.

[31] Ibid.

Table 5.1.3 Categories of private security services in Johannesburg registered with SIRA[1]

| Security Services	Number of security businesses	Total number of employees
Guarding and/or patrolling commercial industrial or residential.	238	30,004
Safeguarding assets in transit, providing secure transport.	27	4,998
Providing close personal protection/ body guarding.	98	11,100
Providing advice on the protection of persons or property, any other security service or the use of security equipment.	12	162
Providing reaction or response services.	11	785
Ensuring safety and order on premises (sporting, recreational and entertainment)	93	10,307
Manufacturing, importing, distributing, or advertising of monitoring devices.	5	108
Functioning as private investigators.	78	10,693
Providing security training or instruction	79	5,103
Installing, servicing or repairing security equipment	14	1,935
Providing services of a locksmith	15	1,978
Monitoring signals from electronic security equipment (security controls room).	90	9,605
Making persons or their services available for rendering a security service.	63	5,723
Providing security at special events	50	2,081
Car watch or related activities	9	43

[1] Please note that a security business may render all these security services or only one or two of these services.

Source: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, Johannesburg.

The increased use of private security services, whether alone or in partnership with the public sector, is not simply a result of the state's failure to address the crime and security issue. The development of private property is increasing and has greatly contributed to the growth of private security industry. Also, as in many new democratic societies emerging from an authoritative regime, this industry grew as a result on the sudden surge of qualified demobilized soldiers with little training or competency other than in combat and defence. Furthermore, the apartheid regime had largely favoured the initial establishment of the private security industry.

The private security sector (see Figure 5.1.2) comprises 'Contract Security' (companies and individuals offering security services and equipment to specific clients for hire or sale) and 'In-House Services' (internal security operations, with many companies that employ staff for protection and security tasks). In the 'Contract Security' sector, human resources must be distinguished from equipment. 'Human Resources' involves

guardians, detectives, guides, reaction units, and cash-in-transit units. 'Equipment' includes manufacture and distribution of products such as electrical fittings, alarm systems, and surveillance cameras. However, the same company can sell alarm systems and reaction units to respond to the alarm systems in case they are activated.

Figure 5.1.2 Breakdown of South African security industry
Source: Phillips (2002), p. 10.

The private security market is beginning not only to undermine, but also to usurp the former monopoly of the public authorities in security issues. In many areas 'panic buttons' are no longer directly linked to the police, but are instead run by private reaction units. The field of activity of these firms is not exclusively limited to the richest areas of Johannesburg. Old combatants of the African National Congress (ANC) have established agencies in some townships in order to sell their 'protection' services to neighbourhoods. However, this type of service in townships is rapidly turning into a form of vigilante activity. While the richest areas shelter the biggest private security companies, that does not mean that there are the only ones to be confronted to private property breaches.

Despite its scale and popularity, this growing private security industry could be seen as a menace for democracy in South Africa. These firms often employ officers, members of the Apartheid South African Police who mostly cannot find any job in the public security sector since the democratic transition. Therefore, they defend private interests of those who can afford to pay for it.

The privatization of security is also related to the trend towards the privatization of the urban landscape in Johannesburg. A new urban architecture is being developed in South Africa, with complexes and malls being built according to a 'fortress model'. While the developers often refer to the model of Italian public open spaces, these developments represent the trend towards defensiveness and exclusion that characterizes the mentality of the 'Johannes-bourgeois'. In 2003, Johannesburg registered about 300 applications for road-closures, a real 'attempt to re-engineer patterns of public-private ownership and control (…) but only few local authorities have policies in place to address the situation.'[32] Beyond the reality of violence, the perceived

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[32] http://www.gatedcomsa.co.za (accessed on 03 June 2004).

subjective insecurity of the upper middle class in residential areas has been reinforced and heightened by their extensive security measures. Residents aim to ensure their protection by building walls, reinforced by electrical gates, by reducing access to their property to one entrance route, and by placing armed guards to control the entrance. Such guards 'must know each inhabitant, know the gardeners and domestics by name, and even the dogs' names'.[33] Thus, urban functionality appears in a privatized way.

CONCLUSION

The private security industry accentuates the gap in security provision between the minority who can afford it and the majority, who must resort to self-policing. The reaction of the middle class, white suburban residents towards the menace of crime is often defined by perceptions of poverty, judged as a source of insecurity. As Stephen Ellis suggests: 'Whites often consider violent criminality as a speciality of their black compatriots; the 'fear of criminality' illustrates the euphemism with which opposition parties and white journalists design today the old fear of 'black peril' (*Swart gevaar*).[34]

The concept of 'security', it could be argued, is becoming a means for the wealthy upper class to continue to differentiate and isolate itself from the poor majority. Such an analysis suggests that the internationally acclaimed 'desegregation' that was supposed to follow the end of the apartheid regime has, in practice, been fairly minimal.

The privatization of the landscape creates spatial and ethical problems. It is a breach of the Constitution to forbid general public access to a town or suburb. Although the creation of urban compounds has not been the subject of a legal challenge, the Johannesburg Metropolitan Council could potentially initiate legal action. As Raymonde Séchet suggests: 'The bunker architecture looks like an inversion of the old enclosing: without being able to isolate the poor from the town, the rich are getting away from them'.[35] This auto-exclusion is based on a 'keep out' mentality, and there is no doubt that urban violence is one of the strongest elements of that dynamic of exclusion. However, a vicious circle is being created, in which urban insecurity leads to the use of security agencies, which in their turn reinforce the very feeling of insecurity that they were aiming to address.

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[33] Laurice Taitz article, *The Sunday Times*, quoted in *Courier International*, no. 439, 1–7 April 1999, p. 5.
[34] Ellis (1997), p. 78.
[35] Séchet (1996), p. 178.