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Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the Bananas Dispute


Mr James McCall Smith , George Washington University .

Research Project

Developing Countries and the Trade Negotiation Process

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banana dispute - bananas - chiquita - compliance bargaining - developing Countries - ecuador - EU trade preferences - negotiations - WTO - WTO compliance panel


Studies of bargaining in the international economy routinely focus on negotiations regarding the original terms of agreements ex ante rather than on discussions regarding compliance with those commitments ex post. A few scholars have called attention to this often neglected aspect of international negotiations (e.g., Albin 2001:49), which J├Ânsson and Tallberg (1998, 2001) refer to as compliance bargaining. The dynamics of compliance bargaining have particular importance for developing countries, whose postagreement negotiating power is arguably constrained in many settings. This paper examines compliance bargaining in the World Trade Organization (WTO) through a case study of Ecuador's tactics in its challenge against the banana import regime of the European Union (EU).


Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the Bananas Dispute
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